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Introduction
The taxation of the Russian banking sector is far too complex to analyse comprehensively in a
relatively short paper. The aim of this paper is therefore rather more modest: it is to deepen our
understanding of how the Russian fiscal system actually operates in the banking sphere and to
draw out the implications of this for the wider problem of tax reform. The paper begins with a
discussion of two aspects of Russian economic culture that are critical to understanding how
the tax system works - informality and bargain - and a look at the somewhat peculiar position of
Russian banks vis-à-vis the fiscal system. This is followed by an overview of the tax regime
applied to the banks and of those aspects of this regime that the banks find most objectionable.
Thereafter the discussion turns to the debate between the authorities and the banks over the
actual tax burden borne by the latter before describing some of the informal strategies employed
by the banks in the pursuit of tax optimisation. The penultimate section describes some of the
formal and informal methods by which the tax organs seek to counter the banks tax avoidance
strategies. This is followed by a brief conclusion. 
Taxation and Russian economic culture
Culture, as it is used in many discussions of post-communist Russia, is a slippery and
potentially dangerous concept. It is often invoked as something of a residual category, to
explain behaviours that external observers find difficult to explain in rational terms, and it is
frequently discussed almost exclusively in terms of subjective perceptions.1 The implication is
that the explanation for Russias post-communist travails lies in cultural legacies, habits
acquired in the past, which are difficult to shake and which  obstruct the successful creation
and function of democratic and market institutions.2 Attempts to explain corruption on the part
of officials and evasion on the part of taxpayers sometimes appeal to deep-seated cultural
norms that favour rent-seeking, cheating and stealing, especially from the state.3 All too often,
references to culture in social explanation either explicitly or implicitly juxtapose culture
against rationality, as though cultural factors were impeding agents progress in learning to
function in new conditions.4 
We reject this view. We do not believe that culture must be invoked to explain apparently
irrational behaviour. Rather, we see the countrys economic culture as providing rational agents
with templates for interpreting new situations and patterns of response to them. There is a strong
element of path-dependence in this: confronted with the realities of Russias half-reformed
economy, Russians have responded with variations on many Soviet-era behaviour patterns.
Indeed, much of what we observe today long pre-dates even the Soviet regime, including a
                                                                
1 See, for example, Alexander Kennaway, The Mental and Psychological Inheritance of Contemporary Russia, The
Euro-Atlantic Foundation, 1997 (http://www.eaf.org/f-paper.htm); see also Antoni Z. Kaminski, An Institutional
Theory of Communist Regimes (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992).
2 Stephen Holmes, Cultural Legacies or State Collapse? Probing the Postcommunist Dilemma, in Michael
Mandelbaum (ed.), Post-Communism: Four Perspectives (New York: CFR, 1996), p. 26. It should be noted that
Holmes is criticising the view quoted, not endorsing it. 
3 See, for example, Kennaway, Mental and Psychological; and Donald Jensen, Patrimonialism in Post-Soviet
Russia, RFE/RL Newsline, 17 July 1997 (http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/07/170797.html). For criticism of this
view, see Gerald M. Easter, Institutional Legacy of the Old Regime as a Constraint to Reform: The Case of Fiscal
Policy, in Stefanie Harter and Gerald Easter (eds), Shaping the Economic Space in Russia (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2000), p. 301.
4 For an excellent discussion of this issue and criticism of western observers use of cultural categories in the post-
communist world in particular, see Holmes, Cultural Legacies. See also Slays criticism of arguments that cultural
factors in Russia somehow attenuate the effectiveness of reforms that have worked elsewhere; Ben Slay, An
Interpretation of the Russian Financial Crisis, Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 40:3 (April-May 1999), p. 208.
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bureaucracy that steals, a commercial class that derives its riches from political connections, a
reliance on patronage relations in both commerce and state administration, and the manipulation
of formal rules to obtain economic benefit. All this would have been familiar enough to Gogols
readers in the reign of Nicholas I. However, these patterns persist not because Russians have
clung to irrational beliefs and practices inherited from the past or failed to adapt psychologically
to new conditions - far from it: ordinary Russians have proved extraordinarily adaptable. Rather,
it is because the easiest strategies of adaptation are often those that are most familiar and
therefore most easily deployed. Moreover, because the market transition is so far from complete
and so many institutional legacies of the old order remain, such adaptive strategies are better
suited to Russian realities than standard western prescriptions.
Our analysis focuses on two closely related aspects of Russian economic culture: informality
and an emphasis on bargain. Countless observers over the years have stressed the limited effect
of formal rules in Russia and, by extension, the importance of informal rules and norms in how
things actually work.5 Russian folk wisdom holds that Russia is a country of unread laws and
unwritten rules and that the imperfection of our laws is compensated for by their non-
observance.6 In discussions of the economy, of course, the informal sector is generally treated
as a private sphere, a place where agents seek to escape the reach of the state and, in particular,
the taxman. The reality, however, is rather different. In a society in which the state is weak and
in which an enormous amount of economic activity takes place on an informal basis, it is all but
inevitable that the state will cope, at least in part, by adopting informal strategies of its own. The
fiscal system is no exception. Indeed, informal practices are so widely employed by Russias
fiscal authorities that one may speak of an informal fiscal system, which coexists with the
formal system much as the shadow economy coexists with the formal sector.7 The formal fiscal
system is not, of course, irrelevant: changes in tax legislation and regulations have important
implications for both tax administration and bank behaviour; the point is simply that these
implications are rarely as straightforward as one might expect.
We do not equate informal fiscal practices with corruption, although informal practices
generally do create opportunities for corruption - a fact which makes it all the more difficult to
put an end to them once they have taken root. Rather, the informal fiscal system consists of the
range of informal practices adopted by the Russian authorities as a matter of policy in an effort
to cope with the countrys fiscal problems and, in particular, with the massive scale of informal
economic activity. Efforts are made from time to time to bring the formal rules into closer
correspondence with actual practice, but sometimes it is not possible to do this: formalising the
rules may deprive officials of the flexibility they believe they need and, in some cases, the
formal rules reflect not so much Russias real fiscal policy as its desire to be seen by outsiders
as a normal market economy.8 Moreover, the system is constantly evolving, defined not
                                                                
5 For an outstanding recent survey of this issue, see Alena Ledeneva, Unwritten Rules: How Russia Really Works
(London: Centre for European Reform, 2001). See also James Leitzel, Rule Evasion in Transitional Russia, in Joan
M. Nelson, Charles Tilly and Lee Walker (eds), Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies (Washington:
National Academy Press, 1997). 
6 Ledeneva, p. 2.
7 Buch et alii write of an unofficial fiscal system; see  Claudia M. Buch, Ralph P. Heinrich, Lusine Lusinyan and
Mechtild Schrooten, Russias Debt Crisis and the Unofficial Economy (Kiel Working Paper No. 978: Kiel Institute
of World Economics, April 2000), esp. at pp. 12 and 23.
8 The case of VAT refunds on exports is a classic example. Russian law provides for the destination principle for
the collection of VAT, as this is standard international practice. However, the authorities as a matter of policy go to
great lengths to avoid granting exporters the VAT refunds to which they are entitled under law. Changing the law is
not an option, as it would complicate Russias international economic relations, so the country is left with a formal
rule that cannot be changed but that the authorities do all they can to circumvent. See W. J. Tompson, Russian
Exporters Seek Changes in VAT Regime, CCH New Law Eastern European Newsletter 35 (November 2000), pp.
1403.
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simply by state policies but by the interaction between private agents and the state, as each
responds to the others moves with new stratagems of its own, with the result that the formal
rules of the game continually lag behind. The informal fiscal sector is the realm of budgetary
offsets, negotiated tax bills, unpenalised tax arrears and other fiscal practices which depend
above all on the attitudes of tax officials rather than on the application of clear, accessible and
consistent rules. Indeed, the contradictory nature of tax legislation virtually ensures a degree of
informality, since it gives officials considerable discretion in deciding which rules to enforce
and when. The problem is that, although informal fiscal practices help the state to mitigate the
revenue losses stemming from the existence of a huge shadow economy, they encourage
shadow activity rather than deter it. The coping mechanism - informal fiscal policy - thus
impedes the resolution of the problem, making it harder to bring shadow activities into the
formal sector. 
Closely related to this emphasis on informality is another aspect of Russias economic culture
we believe is central to understanding how the fiscal system operates in practice. This is the
emphasis on bargaining. Outside observers are well aware of the much-criticised practice
whereby very large Russian corporates negotiate their tax bills with the state.9 Less well known
is the extent to which the tax bills of small and medium-sized Russian companies are also
negotiated. Tax bills at all levels are largely the subject of informal bargaining between
taxpayers and officials. The formal rules of the game - tax legislation, normative acts,
instructions from the Ministry of Taxes and Duties (MNS), etc - are important factors in these
negotiations but they are scarcely definitive when it comes to determining the actual tax bill that
a given taxpayer will end up paying. Clearly, in the field of taxation, bargaining and informality
are two sides of the same coin: while there is plenty of scope for bargain in any market
economy, tax bills are not ordinarily the subject of negotiation. If the formal rules of the fiscal
system were applied in practice, the scope for bargain would be very limited. 
The centrality of bargaining may seem surprising at first glance - after all, the relationship
between taxpayer and taxman is not normally based on negotiation. In modern societies, at least,
it is supposed to be hierarchical and to rest on the strict application of clear formal rules.10 In
Russia, however, the bargained tax bill is no greater a paradox than was the bargained plan.
Students of the command economy were well aware during the Soviet period that the process of
planning - which in theory was about the disaggregation and assignment of economic tasks by
higher authorities to lower - was very much a process of negotiation rather than simply
command.11 Enterprises sought to conceal their potential and limit the demands made to them,
while ministerial officials pressed for more, always assuming that the enterprise had substantial
concealed reserves - much as the tax inspector today tries to estimate how much income or
activity a company is keeping off the books. These similarities are not accidental. Post-Soviet
tax collectors are no less subject to target-fulfilment pressures than were Soviet-era
administrators in the planned economy. Whereas the latter were under pressure to ensure that
the enterprises for which they were responsible met or exceeded planned production targets, the
former are driven by the need to meet their assigned revenue-collection targets.12 In Weberian
terms, the business of the tax organs is not rule application but task fulfilment. The assignment
                                                                
9 Easter, Institutional Legacy of the Old Regime, pp. 30711.
10 It should be noted that many other societies have relied on less formal systems and, like contemporary Russia, have
made use of material incentives to motivate tax collectors; the institution of tax farming is a classic example.
11 See, for example, Peter Rutland, The Myth of the Plan (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1985); Michael Ellman,
Socialist Planning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977).
12 See Andrei Yakovlev, Informal Tax Competition at Regional Level: The Case of Russia (Moscow: Mimeo,
2001), p. 3; and idem, Pochemu v Rossii vozmozhen bezriskovyi ukhod ot nalogov?, Voprosy ekonomiki 11
(November) 2000.
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of revenue-collection targets to tax inspectorates is reinforced by the use of material incentives
to improve the work of the tax organs by allowing them, under certain circumstances, to
distribute a share of the fines and taxes collected in the form of bonuses.13 This ensures that
revenue maximisation, not law enforcement, is the central concern of the tax organs. 
The peculiar position of the banks
Before proceeding to consider the tax regime in the banking sector, it is necessary to highlight a
few of the peculiar features of Russian banks that are relevant to understanding how Russian
banks manage their relationships with the tax organs. The first point is that the great majority of
banks are generally reckoned to be pocket banks, controlled by a single large corporate
shareholder or, more commonly, a small group of related companies and individuals, which
operate the bank for their own convenience.14 One recent survey of the sector concluded that
only 1020 of about 1,300 banks active in Russia in 2001 were genuinely independent financial
institutions; the rest were best viewed as tools of business groupings or state institutions of one
sort or another.15 However, many of these independent banks are regional and small, while some
of the pocket banks are relatively large. Because the controlling groups of some pocket banks
are gigantic by Russian standards, their banks have attracted talented staff, who have developed
relatively sophisticated financial products that are offered to a wide clientele. In many cases, the
franchise value of these pocket banks is substantial, giving those who control them an incentive
to develop them as businesses rather than to exploit them for short-term gain.16 Taking into
account independence, stand-alone business operations and client base, there are about 5060
banks that can be considered to be fully operating financial institutions.17 Some banks have
achieved independence by carefully playing off major shareholders against each other. Such
banks are unlikely to seek a broader shareholder base, while the controlling groups behind most
pocket banks do not want to let any one else affect their cashflows.18 This is why the shares of
only one Russian bank - the state-controlled savings giant Sberbank - are publicly traded.19 The
attitudes of controlling shareholders towards pocket banks vary, but profit-maximisation is not
generally their primary concern. Banks are created and operated to provide payment services
and other financial products to their ownerclients and to assist them in optimising their
                                                                
13 See, for example, the various schemes for allowing the Tax Police to keep a proportion (from 10 to 50%) of taxes
recovered and fines collected: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts SU/1996 (13 May 1994) C/3; and Alexander
Morozov, Tax Administration in Russia, East European Constitutional Review 5:2 (Spring/Summer 1996), p. 44.
Morozov indicates that the practice was discontinued in 1995, but in June 1996, facing massive revenue shortfalls,
the authorities announced that the Tax Police would keep 50% of any taxes they recovered to the end of the year;
Segodnya, 28 June 1996. See also Oxford Analytica, East Europe Daily Brief, 13 February 1995, I, and 28 January
2000, I. There was, indeed, some evidence that the authorities in the late 1990s deliberately kept the Tax Police
under-funded in order to increase their incentives to collect additional revenue (Oxford Analytica, East Europe Daily
Brief, 18 August 1998, I).
14 This view is most strongly put by Lev Makarevich of the Association of Russian Banks, who (despite his
institutional affiliation) insists that the vast majority of Russian banks, including state-owned banks, must be viewed
as the pocket banks of various institutions and business clans, whose primary interest in operating a bank is not its
profitability (interview with Lev Makarevich, Moscow, 22 August 2001). See also Aleksandr Skabichevskii, Bank-
truba ili koalitsiya zaemshchikov?, Kompaniya-banki 6(30) (11 June 2001). 
15 Private information concerning an analysis done by staff of one of the international financial institutions.
16 These are the banks designated by Prill as trust banks; in many respects they resemble corporate treasuries but
they are outside the company and often service a number of companies in a grouping, as well as providing services to
outsiders. See Oliver Prill, Financial Sector Reform in the Soviet Union/Russia since 1987: Options and
Consequences (D.Phil Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995).
17 Internal estimate by RusRating.
18 Private information concerning an analysis done by staff of one of the international financial institutions.
19 Skabichevskii, Bank-truba, p. 4. 
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taxes.20 Banks offer significant advantages as providers of tax-related services. They concentrate
financial expertise, much of which is dedicated to working out successful tax optimisation
strategies, and they are often able to implement the strategies they recommend, which gives
them a distinct advantage when competing with accounting firms and financial consultants.21
Lev Makarevich of the Association of Russian Banks writes, Avoiding taxes owed to budgets
at all levels is a complete industry, and, from the point of view of the Ministry of Taxes and
Duties, the banks serve as its most important part.22 
Secondly, although their lending activity has picked up substantially since 1999, Russian banks
still do relatively little actual banking in the sense of commercially based financial
intermediation.23 As of January 2001, the sectors gross assets amounted to no more than about
35% of GDP, which was relatively low by the standards of Central Europes transition
economies and even lower in comparison with developed western economies. Nor do Russian
banks engage much in lending to the non-financial private sector. In early 2001, such lending
was only slightly above 30% of the sectors total assets, not much changed from pre-crisis
levels.24 The share of bank credits in the total volume of investment in fixed assets in 2000 has
been variously estimated at between 3.9% and 10%.25 While Russian banks have become much
more active in crediting the real sector since 1999, their lending tends to be dangerously
concentrated - a reflection of their primary concern with servicing shareholders needs. Central
bank data show around 30% of bank loans outstanding in early 2001 as large credit risks,
mainly owing to excessive lending to a single borrower. Many banks exhibit a pronounced, and
dangerous, tendency to specialise in lending to particular sectors.26
A third feature of Russian banks is that they play a dual role vis-à-vis the tax organs. Banks are,
of course, taxpayers, but they are required to act as agents of the fisc.27 Tax collection is largely
executed via the payments system and the tax authorities depend heavily on the banks for
information about clients finances and for cooperation in tax collection.28 The collection of
                                                                
20 In general, we prefer the Russian expression optimisation or the relatively neutral avoidance and minimisation
to the more widely employed western term evasion. The latter implies a host of assumptions about the nature of the
tax system that, in our view, are somewhat problematic in a Russian context.
21 Both Skabichevskii and Makarevich see tax optimisation as central to Russian banks purpose and functions. See
Aleksandr Skabichevskii, Nedokhodnoe mesto, Kompaniya-banki 4(28) (9 April 2001), pp. 810; Makarevich,
Novye aspekty, pp. 71ff; and idem, Foreign Investors in the Emerging Russian Market (Brisbane: Asmo Press,
2001), pp. 469; and interview with Makarevich, Moscow, 22 August 2001.
22 Makarevich, Novye aspekty, p. 71.
23 See Lev Makarevich, Novye aspekty nalogooblozheniya dokhodov organizatsii v 2001 godu, Nalogooblozhenie,
uchet i otchetnost v kommercheskom banke 1 (January) 2001, pp. 747; and William Tompson, Russian Banking
after 1998: Problems of Reform and the Future, in David Lane (ed.), Russian Banking: Evolution, Problems and
Prospects (London: Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2002).
24 The TsBRs Byulleten bankovskoi statistiki 3(94) (March 2001), p. 23, gives a figure of 33.81% for claims on the
non-financial private sector and households. Deducting the household share, which was around 2%, would yield a
figure closer to 30%.
25 Central Bank of Russia (TsBR) Kontseptualnye voprosy razvitiya bankovskoi sistemy Rossiisskoi Federatsii,
Vestnik Banka Rossii 12 (512) (February 2001), prilozh. 1; Vedomosti, 23 January 2001.
26 Aleksandr Skabichevskii, Kreditnyi pereplokh, Kompaniya-banki 5 (29) (14 May 2001), pp. 24; the TsBR view
is in TsBR, Kontseptsualnye voprosy, para 2.2.1.
27 A. Yu. Petrov, Analiz nalogooblozheniya kommercheskikh bankov (Moscow: REA imeni Plekhanova, 1999), p. 16.
28 These issues are discussed at length in William Tompson, Old Habits Die Hard: Fiscal Imperatives, State
Regulation and the Role of Russias Banks, EuropeAsia Studies 49:7 (November 1997). The importance the
authorities attach to this aspect of the banks activities was particularly apparent after the 1998 financial collapse; see
idem Nothing Learned, Nothing Forgotten: Restructuring without Reform in Russias Banking Sector, in Stefanie
Harter and Gerald M. Easter (eds), Shaping the Economic Space in Russia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 735, 78
81. This emphasis is also reflected in much Russian writing about the tax obligations of banks, which is in fact
about the mechanics of taxation of other agents via banks: see, for example, Petrov, pp. 57120.
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taxes via the financial system gives enterprises an enormous incentive to settle transactions
outside that system.29 The easiest way to avoid taxation is, of course, via the use of cash - the so-
called black cash (chernyi nal) that fuels so much economic activity in Russia.30 However,
most corporates can rely on black cash strategies only to a limited degree, and even then they
often require the banks cooperation in securing substantial quantities of cash in violation of
restrictions on the use of cash for inter-company transactions.31 The banks participation is thus
essential to the success of most tax optimisation strategies. Their handling of financial flows and
their access to financial information place them in a key strategic position between the tax
organs and other taxpayers, on the basis of which they often build very profitable lines of
business.
Indeed, tax optimisation is one of the reasons for the emergence of such a large number of banks
in Russia in the early 1990s. Russian law distinguishes between two types of loan: ssud and
zaim. The former is extended by a bank to its clients, while the latter is extended by one
business to another. Crucially, interest paid on ssudy is tax deductible, while that paid on zaimy
is not. As a result, two Russian corporates wishing to enter into a loan transaction have good
reason to avoid a zaim. There were, of course, many other ways for Russian firms to borrow
from one another, and for much of the post-Soviet period, most credit creation has taken place
outside the financial system altogether. 
Russian firms in the 1990s borrowed far more from workers, enterprises and the state by not
paying their bills than they did from commercial banks. Overdue payables for much of this
period were roughly double the total domestic credit extended by the commercial banks.
Moreover, since banks claims on the non-financial private sector constituted only a fraction of
total credit, the ratio of arrears to bank credits to the real sector was even greater.32 In addition,
there has been widespread employment of barter, mutual offsets, bills of exchange (vekselya)
and other money surrogates, which are often employed to extend credit without involving the
taxman.33 However, these mechanisms are insufficient if the borrower requires live money
(zhivye dengi - cash or bank money); channelling the loan through a pocket bank then offers
distinct tax advantages, as well as ensuring that financial flows run through structures controlled
by the clients. 
The formal rules: Russian tax legislation and the banks
Russian banks are subject to around 300 different taxes, duties and mandatory payments to
budgets and off-budget funds at various levels, although many of these charges are levied only
in specific locales.34 The number of economically significant taxes is much smaller. The most
                                                                
29 Ickes and Ryterman first drew attention to this aspect of the problem in 1992; Barry W. Ickes and Randi Ryterman,
The Interenterprise Arrears Crisis in Russia, Post-Soviet Affairs 8:4 (1992), pp. 3569.
30 For an excellent discussion of the strategies deployed for obtaining and using black cash, see Andrei Yakovlev,
Black Cash Tax Evasion in Russia: Its Forms, Incentives and Consequences at Firm Level, Europe-Asia Studies
53:1 (January 2001).
31 See Yakovlev, Black Cash Tax Evasion, p. 42; and Tompson, Old Habits, pp. 11625.
32 See the data series in Russian Economic Trends Monthly Update, October 2000, table 7 and TsBR data. At times,
total (commercial and central bank) domestic credit in the financial system was not much larger than total overdue
payables.
33 For an outstanding account of non-monetary exchange in Russias post-Soviet economy, see David Woodruff,
Money Unmade: Barter and the Fate of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). See also
Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes, Russias Virtual Economy, Foreign Affairs 77:5 (SeptemberOctober 1998); and
William Tompson, The Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing? Unravelling the Workings of Russias
Virtual Economy, Economy and Society 28:2 (May 1999).
34 Petrov, p. 22.
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important include VAT, the profit tax, social taxes, the tax on sales of foreign currency and
turnover taxes.
VAT is in many ways the least problematic for the banks, in which respect banking differs from
most other economic sectors - VAT was by far the most important source of tax revenue in the
1990s and most sectors paid considerably more in VAT than they did in profit tax.35 During the
1990s, the law exempted from VAT those banking operations identified as such in the original
definitions provided in the 1990 law On banks and banking.36 Under the VAT provisions of
the new Russian Federation Tax Code, which entered into force in 2001, this list has been
expanded to encompass other banking operations, including the extension of guarantees to third
parties and the provision of certain consultancy and other services within the broader bank
client relationship.37 However, banks are generally required to pay VAT on other transactions,
including those which fall within the definition of banking operation but are performed on
behalf of another party for a commission. These activities form the bulk of the VAT base of
most commercial banks.
Until 1994, the banks did not pay profit tax but were instead subject to a tax levied on their
gross income. This was changed under a presidential decree adopted at the end of 1993, which
scrapped the income tax and subjected the banks to the profit tax levied on all corporates, albeit
at a higher rate.38 While other taxpayers paid only a 38% rate of profit tax (later cut to 35%), the
banks were subject to a maximum rate of 43%, comprising a 13% rate paid to the federal budget
and a maximum 30% rate paid to the budgets of subjects of the federation. This latter rate could
be reduced to 25% if the regional authority so chose (only a few did, the most important being
St Petersburg). The federal rate could be cut to 8% in the case of banks extending more than
50% of their loan portfolio to small businesses or agro-industrial enterprises.39 Since few
regional authorities have cut their profit tax rates and few banks dare concentrate their lending
in such high-risk sectors as agriculture and small business, the great majority of Russian banks
are subject to a 43% rate of profit tax, albeit with numerous exemptions and loopholes. Until
1997, for example, operations involving government securities were not taxed; thereafter, the
tax exemption was removed from operations on the GKO/OFZ market but not from Russian
Federation Eurobonds.40
Like all corporates, banks have until the end of 2000 been subject to a range of social taxes and
charges to off-budget funds like the pension fund, which were levied on all employers. Taken
together, these taxes imposed an effective rate of tax on wage funds of 38.5%. In 2001, the
authorities introduced a new unified social tax (ESN), which replaces payments to three off-
budget funds: the Pension Fund, the Fund for Mandatory Medical Insurance and the Social
Insurance Fund. This should reduce employers costs and is further intended to increase
                                                                
35 VAT was generally a far more important source of revenue for the consolidated budget than the profit tax in the
1990s. In some years, VAT receipts were nearly double profit tax receipts and in the crisis year of 1998, VAT
revenues were roughly triple profit tax proceeds (though both were far smaller relative to GDP than in 1997). See
Goskomstat RF, Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1998g. (Moscow, Goskomstat, 1998), pp. 6501; and  idem,
Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1999g. (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1999), pp. 4923.
36 Vedomosti Sezda narodnykh deputatov RSFSR 27 (6 December 1990), st. 357.
37 See chapter 21 of the new Russian Federation Tax Code.
38 O nekotorykh izmeneniyakh v nalogooblozheniya i vzaimootnosheniyakh byudzhetov razlichnykh urovnei, Ukaz
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39 A. I. Ivanov, Nalogovaya politika gosudarstva po regulirovaniyu deyatelnosti kommercheskikh bankov,
Bankovskoe delo 2 (February 1996), p. 9.
40 Ivanov, p. 9; Segodnya, 14 March 1997.
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government control over the finances of the off-budget funds. The rates of the unified social tax
are based on a regressive scale ranging from 35.6% to 5.0% (falling to 2.0% in 2002). The aim
of this regressive sliding scale is to reduce the incentives for employers to collude in concealing
employees incomes.41 However, the normative acts adopted by the tax organs have made it
much more difficult for most companies to avail themselves of the sliding scale. The lower rates
may be applied only if the company has been in operation for more than a year, the formulae set
down for calculating salary levels contain a deliberate downward bias, and the lower rates apply
only to employees above the relevant threshold in companies where the average (as calculated
under the downward-biased MNS guidelines) exceeds that threshold. Bizarrely, therefore, it is
the tax organs in this case who are effectively depressing the level of reported wages and
salaries.42
The tax on sales of foreign currency may soon be scrapped. Since its introduction in July 1997,
it has been unpopular with the banking community and ineffective as a source of revenue. When
the tax was first adopted, it was a 0.5% levy on purchases of foreign currency or financial
instruments denominated in foreign currencies, save for commercial banks purchases of foreign
cash from the Central Bank of Russia (TsBR).43 Within a year, the rate was doubled to 1.0% and
in 2000 it was doubled again to 2.0%.44 Though notionally a tax paid by purchasers of foreign
cash, it is effectively paid out of the profits of the banks and other foreign exchange dealers.45 
Finally, turnover taxes have until recently accounted for a large share of banks tax liabilities,
mostly to regional and local budgets. Prior to the adoption of the new Tax Code, banks and
other corporates were required to pay a road tax of 2.5% of gross income and a tax for the
support of the municipal housing stock and socio-cultural infrastructure at a rate of 1.5%. Since
most regional authorities have imposed at least one local turnover tax of their own, it is fair to
estimate that the cumulative rate of turnover taxes has, until the introduction of part 2 of the RF
Tax Code this year, been around 5% or more. The tax base for turnover taxes in the banks case
is gross income from the provision of banking services. Crudely, this amounts to the banks
gross income, less income from activities enjoying official tax privileges (e.g. operations with
government securities), paper income arising when banks compliance with regulatory norms
results in the appearance of income on their books that is not really income in any economic
sense, and, in some cases, income from non-bank operations such as the leasing of bank
property (this last is included in the calculation of the municipal housing/socio-cultural
infrastructure tax and some local taxes).46 Garegin Tosunyan of Tekhnobank, the vice-president
of the Association of Russian Banks, insists that these are perhaps the most objectionable taxes
from the banks perspective, since they take no account of profitability.47
The banks complaints 
In common with sectors such as fuel and metallurgy, Russian banks have consistently
complained that the tax system discriminates against them and that they bear a disproportionate
                                                                
41 At the same time, the new 13% flat rate of income tax has significantly reduced employees incentives to conceal
income.
42 In particular, the MNS has decided that the outliers should be eliminated from the distribution when calculating the
average salary mentioned in the legislation. Because outliers at the top are likely to be much further from the
median than those at the bottom, this biases the overall average downwards.
43 Kommersant-Daily, 26 July 1997; Segodnya, 26 July 1997. 
44 Izvestiya, 20 December 1997; Troika Dialog, Russian Market Weekly, 20 March 2000.
45 Makarevich, Novye aspekty, p. 70.
46 M. V. Beletskii, Novoe v nalogooblozheniya kommercheskikh bankov, Finansy 2 (February) 2001, p. 33.
47 Interview with Garegin Tosunyan, Moscow, 23 August 2001.
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share of the tax burden. The authorities, by contrast, argue that the banks position is
particularly privileged, in practice if not in law, because of their skill at tax evasion - an
argument frequently deployed by the authorities with respect to export sectors such as
metallurgy, oil and gas.48 Makarevich thus write of an undeclared war between the MNS and
the banking sector.49 
Formally, at least, the banks have a point. For one thing, they have been subject to a higher rate
of profit tax than non-banks. The major exception to this higher rate - the provision reducing the
rate applied to banks concentrating on lending to agricultural or agro-industrial enterprises or to
small businesses50 - is an economically perverse measure. It rewards banks for lending to high-
risk borrowers and thus runs counter to the aims of prudential regulation. At the same time, the
tax authorities definition of the basis for calculating taxable profits has often occasioned
complaints from the banks. For example, until late 1998, the GNS did not allow losses from
securities transactions to reduce taxable profits.51 Even if profit from operations with securities
over a given period was equal to or less than zero, the income from profitable transactions was
included in the calculation of taxable profits, with no provision for deducting losses incurred on
unprofitable ones.52 
Tosunyan argues strongly that the failure to exclude loan-loss reserves (LLRs) from the profit
tax base is also a problem for the banks, since it means that many assets become unprofitable as
soon as provision is made for them. Banks get around this by transforming potentially
problematic assets into vekselya and other such instruments, which are not subject to reserve
requirements and which in many cases are off-balance sheet. Since such alternatives are less
transparent than loans on the books, these practices also make it harder to assess banks
soundness. Tosunyan argues that funds set aside for LLRs should be excluded from the
calculation of taxable profits.53 This would be consistent with International Accounting
Standards (IAS), to which Russian banks are now moving. When a banks LLRs increase
because a loan is moved from one risk category to another, IAS rules permit the whole of the
increase to be counted as a loss, and hence a reduction of net income. In a stable bank, the
number of loans going from poor risk to high risk is roughly matched by loans going the other
way, so loan-loss charges should not have a huge impact on the profit-and-loss (P&L) account
as a whole. If a loan that has been (wholly or partly) written off is then repaid, the reserve that
was formed against it must be shown as income in the P&L account. It thus increases the tax
base. The Russian tax authorities fear that if banks were permitted to charge any increase in
their LLRs to losses, they would create massive reserves to reduce profits. This would,
however, be safer for the banks - hence the TsBRs support for such a change despite the fiscs
opposition. The tax organs are willing to allow bad loans to be set against tax, but only when the
loan is actually written off. They will not extend tax relief until the loan has actually gone bad. 
Tosunyan also argues that banks should be permitted to reduce their tax bases to reflect losses
from dealings in securities in previous years. He notes that the law on the profit tax allows such
a deduction for losses from the sale of goods and services but not financial instruments.54 This
last point reflects just one of the many ways in which bankers believe that the fine detail of
                                                                
48 See, for example, Stephen Fortescue, Taxation in the Russian Mining and Metals Sector (Forschungsstelle
Osteuropa an der Universität Bremen: Arbeitspapier No. 27, July 2001).
49 Makarevich, Novye aspekty, p. 70.
50 Ivanov, Nalogovaya politika, p. 9.
51 Kommersant-Daily, 18 August 1998.
52 Kommersant-Daily, 18 June 1998 and 18 August 1998.
53 Interview with Garegin Tosunyan, Moscow, 23 August 2001; see also G. A. Tosunyan, Tezisy G. A. Tosunyana o
reforme bankovskoi sistemy Rossii (Moscow: mimeo, 9 August 2001), pt 5.
54 Tosunyan, Tezisy, pt 6.
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profit tax legislation has discriminated against them - and will continue to do so even under the
new profit tax. For example, the tax organs have often refused to allow banks to take advantage
of tax breaks provided for capital investment in the construction and equipping of offices or the
opening of representative offices and branches. The fiscal organs argue that this tax break is
intended for investment in production and that banks are not normally regarded part of the
economys productive sphere (proizvodstvennoi sferoi).55 Some observers believe the tax
organs interpretation of this tax break to be correct, in which case it is legislative change that is
needed, while others put a broader construction on the rules and believe that the tax authorities
are deliberately restricting the application of a provision that banks should legitimately be able
to employ. Either way, the Association of Russian Banks has pressed hard for the extension of
the list of expenditure items that can be deducted from banks tax bases.56
In addition to the profit tax, banks have with some justice complained about the burden of
turnover taxes imposed on them, a complaint they share with corporates in other sectors. The
phasing out of most remaining turnover taxes under the new tax code is thus a welcome
development from the banks perspective. 
Informally, the banks may be subject to other forms of discriminatory revenue extraction by the
authorities. According to Tosunyan, regional and local authorities, in particular, have tended to
squeeze the banks via non-tax measures such as more expensive leases on land and other
property, as well as higher charges for telecommunications, utilities and other services. It is
difficult to assess the validity of Tosunyans complaint on the basis of the data available, but it
does seem entirely plausible. The Russian authorities at all levels have routinely operated
complex schedules of tariffs for electricity and transport, in particular, which enable them to
favour some consumers (sometimes whole sectors and sometimes individual businesses) at the
expense of others. These amount to a form of hidden industrial policy and it is entirely likely
that the banks, seen as cash cows by revenue-strapped governors, are often net donors in such
situations. 
More generally, one would expect the banks to come under greater pressure from the tax organs
than most taxpayers. This is because, given the pressure to meet revenue targets and the limited
capacities of the tax inspectorate, tax collectors have tended to focus on the most visible,
accessible taxpayers and especially on those thought able to pay. When the fiscal press has been
tightened, the tax organs have generally found it easier to tighten their grip on those already
paying than to broaden the tax base by tracking down funds channelled through fly-by-night
shell companies (firmy-odnodnevki) or investigating complex tax frauds. While the aggregate
losses sustained by the treasury as a result of the activities of the firmy-odnodnevki are
staggering, the costs of investigation and enforcement in any given case are likely to exceed by
far the revenue gained. Thus, the tax organs in the 1990s devoted their energies to squeezing
ever more revenue from those they could monitor rather than pursuing those they could not.57
By 1998, some 238 corporates accounted for over half of tax revenues paid to the consolidated
budget - out of around 2.8 million companies registered as taxpayers.58 The logic of this
approach to tax administration would suggest that the banks would be prime targets for the tax
inspectorate. Petrov argues that this is indeed the case. While outlining the formal legal criteria
governing the selection of corporate taxpayers for full documentary audits by the tax
inspectorate, he claims that the tax organs are in reality motivated more by the desire to raise
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revenue via the extraction of fines and penalties than by the desire to enforce tax legislation. As
a result, banks are favoured targets: they are seen to be liquid and their financial affairs are
sufficiently complicated to make it easy to find violations. Moreover, banks are often audited as
a matter of course when non-bank companies with which they have close links are audited.59
Assessing the banks tax burden
The real question is not so much about the nature of tax legislation as about whether or not the
effective tax burden on the banks is really much heavier than on other economic sectors. The
authorities routinely accuse the banks of tax evasion on a massive scale - on their own account
and on behalf of clients - and insist that the financial expertise of the banks makes them
especially well placed to shift funds about in order to avoid taxation. The tax organs have
conducted repeated and widespread checks not only of banks own tax records but of their
handling of clients tax payments, finding - not surprisingly - that delays in the processing of
clients payments are much the more serious problem, although they have also found
considerable evidence of underpayment by the banks themselves. The sums cited have
frequently run into the tens of billions of roubles (tens of trillions prior to the 1998
redenomination).60 In one of the biggest cases, a group of banks in the northwest were found by
the Tax Police to have defrauded the state of Rb200bn in tax revenues, using illegal encashment
and conversion schemes to move funds abroad in violation of currency controls. Both the banks
and their leading clients were found to have been engaged in large-scale violations of tax and
currency control legislation.61
The authorities have tended to focus on the breakdown of tax revenues by sector of origin. In
particular, they complained publicly and at length when it appeared that the banks share of tax
revenues was declining. Altogether, the banking sectors share of total tax revenues fell from
around 12% in 1994 to around 3% in late 1996 and 5.2% in the first quarter of 1997, largely as a
result of the halving of the banks share of profit tax revenues, from 11.6% in 1994 (the first
year in which the banks were subject to the profit tax) to 5.6% in 1996. Further declines were
registered in 1997.62 Although it was clear to most observers that the banks were under
increasing strain in 199498, the authorities attributed their declining share of total tax revenues
to increasingly skillful evasion. This was one of the reasons for the attempt in 1997 to introduce
a tax on bank assets as a possible replacement for the profit tax. Of course, other sectors
concealed substantial profits but this mattered far more in banking, for VAT, rather than the
profit tax, was the main source of tax revenue from most sectors throughout the 1990s. Since
most banking operations are not subject to VAT, the profit tax was and is much more important
in determining the tax liabilities of banks than those of non-banks. 
Bankers insist that the nature of their business makes avoiding taxation more rather than less
difficult. Their finances are subject to much closer monitoring by the authorities - chiefly the
central bank - and, because finance is their business, they are less able to engage in barter
transactions and other tax avoidance strategies commonly employed by real-sector firms. As
Tosunyan puts it, a banks entire turnover is visible to the authorities.63 Tosunyan maintains
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Kommersant-Daily, 17 September 1996, 16 July 1997 and 29 June 1999; Finansovye izvestiya, 11 September 1997
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63 Interview with G. A. Tosunyan, Moscow, 23 August 2001.
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that turnover taxes have, for this reason, been much more difficult to minimise than profit tax
bills. He does, however, acknowledge that some informal clearing arrangements among banks
do serve to hold down recorded turnover. At any rate, banks appear to have been less able to
accumulate large tax arrears with impunity than industrial firms have been.64 Thus, despite
numerous official complaints about banks tax discipline in 1997, the banking sector was one of
the very few that, according to the State Tax Service (as it then was), registered no growth in tax
arrears over the year.65 While official complaints about tax evasion on the part of the banks are
not uncommon, the authorities have tended to devote far more attention to the banks collusion
in tax avoidance on the part of their clients, which suggests that the taxes paid by the banks
themselves are less of a concern.
There is no simple, straightforward way to resolve this issue, since there is no obvious basis on
which to compare the tax burdens on different sectors. There are data on relative tax burdens
for 199599, based on the ratio of individual sectors share in total tax payments to their shares
in GDP. For every year except 1995, these data show the banking and insurance share of total
tax payments to be much greater than the corresponding share of GDP (see Table 1). Indeed, the
financial sector is the only one to show such high ratios of tax share to GDP share. This
suggests that there may be some basis for the banks complaints that they bear a
disproportionate share of the tax burden. However, comparing the relative weights of different
sectors in GDP and in total tax revenues is more than a little problematic as a basis for
comparison, since it takes no account of the relative profitability of different activities and
sectors. Given such wide - and, during economic transition, rapidly changing - differences in
relative profitability, there is no reason to expect too close a correlation between share of GDP
and share of tax revenues.66
Table 1: Relative tax burden (share in tax payments/share in GDP)
Sector 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Agriculture 0.46 0.58 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.19
Industry 1.83 1.89 1.58 1.64 1.53 1.55
Trade 0.45 0.64 0.64 0.40 0.52 0.47
Transport 1.42 0.93 1.70 1.71 1.70 1.97
Banking & Insurance n/a 0.89 5.87 4.42 8.52 3.57
Construction 1.17 0.97 1.09 0.97 1.01 1.07
Other 0.40 0.53 0.55 0.68 0.67 0.64
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Calculation of the research project The Role of Economic Culture in Russias Tax System (Research
Centre for East European Studies, Bremen) based on data from the MNS and Goskomstat. 
 
A comparison that took profitability into account would tell us more, but data on profitability
are the most problematic of all, since declared profits across the economy are grossly under-
stated in an effort to avoid taxation. Nor can one even assume a roughly equal propensity to
conceal profits. An assumed law of equal cheating would enable us to make use of the official
data, but the point is precisely that we would expect the extent of concealment to increase with
profitability. Unprofitable enterprises and sectors have no profits to hide, while the most
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record no arrears growth were communications and pipeline transport (the latter being a state monopoly anyway).
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profitable have more to hide and can be expected to do so. Moreover, the market transformation
has involved sharp changes in the relative profitability of different firms and sectors, making
informed estimates still more difficult. In any case, one can easily argue that both the banks and
the authorities have a point, since the formal burdens imposed on banks are a burden even if
they are evaded. This is because most tax optimisation strategies involve costs of their own - a
point often overlooked in discussions of tax avoidance. Taxes cost taxpayers more than they
yield the state. Thus, it is entirely possible for discriminatory provisions such as the higher
profit tax rate to impose real costs on the banks and yet for the government to find that the
banks pay less than it thinks they should. 
Yet if there is no really suitable data on which to base a judgement about the banks tax
treatment relative to that of other sectors, the circumstantial evidence would suggest that the
reality may be closer to the authorities view than a cursory look at the data above would
suggest. Several factors point to this conclusion. First, while the banks have complained about
aspects of the tax system that they see as particularly detrimental to their interests, tax issues
have never been at the top of their lobbying agenda in the way that export duties and other fiscal
questions have sometimes dominated the governments relations with the major exporting
sectors, namely energy and metals.67 Rather, the banks have tended to be much more concerned
with regulatory issues, accounting reform and their rights as creditors. As far as macroeconomic
policy was concerned, the banks major problem with the authorities during the 1990s was the
extent to which they bore a disproportionate share of the costs of monetary rather than fiscal
policy. The TsBRs limited range of monetary policy instruments and its heavy reliance on
things like reserve requirements as tools of macroeconomic management meant that monetary
tightening had a far more direct effect on the banks than on other sectors. The fact that shifts in
the monetary stance sometimes occurred without warning merely aggravated the problem.68 In
so far as they have complained about the tax system, Tikhomirov argues that the banks biggest
concerns have not been with the discriminatory provisions - profit tax is too easily avoided for
this to be more than a nuisance for most banks - but with the instability and lack of clarity of tax
legislation. The banks have repeatedly found themselves subject to contradictory instructions,
most famously when the TsBR, the GNS and the finance ministry chose to ignore an
amendment to article 855 of the RF Civil Code and insisted on the priority of tax payments over
the payment of wages in cases where corporate accounts had insufficient funds to cover both.
The banks could either violate the Civil Code and obey the tax authorities - thereby alienating
local authorities, managers and workers - or follow the code and risk the wrath of the tax organs
and the TsBRF.69 In late 1996, the Supreme Court struck down the inter-departmental letter that
contradicted article 855, but the tax inspectorate continued to follow the letter, in violation of
the code.70 This is but one example: the banks continued to face many other contradictions and
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68 See William Tompson, The Politics of Central Bank Independence in Russia, EuropeAsia Studies 50:7
(November 1998); and Stephen Lewarne, Legal Aspects of Monetary Policy in the Former Soviet Union, Europe
Asia Studies 45:2 (1993). The most striking instance was the pre-election raid of June 1996, when the State Duma,
prompted by the finance ministry, hastily passed a bill requiring the TsBR to transfer its 1994 profit to the budget.
The president quickly signed it. The central banks response was to raise reserve requirements, lower the ceiling on
open currency positions and suspend Lombard auctions, all measures which fell disproportionately on the banks, even
though the Bank was countering an action by the executive and the legislature that would not bring any special
benefits to the financial sector. For a more general discussion of the TsBRs limited policy tools and their
implications for the banks (see Tompson, Politics, pp. 11745). 
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supported the changes in the Civil Code, which were opposed by the TsBR and the government.
70 Finansovye izvestiya, 11 September 1997.
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confusions in tax legislation and considerable uncertainty about how it would be administered.71
Secondly, the banks declared profits are generally very small and clearly understated. The
declared profits of Russias twenty (officially) most profitable banks in 2000 (see Table 2)
reveal a striking pattern: large profits were declared by banks with large or controlling foreign
shareholders and by banks with substantial foreign debt service payments falling due in 2001. In
the latter cases, Skabichevskii argues that there was a marked correlation between the size of
those obligations and the size of the banks declared profits.72 The list is also noteworthy for the
banks not on it, including a number of major banks which appear to external observers to have
had good years in 2000 but which have not declared large profits under Russian Accounting
Standards (RAS), which form the basis for their tax bills. MDM Bank, for example, has been
keen to advertise its profitability under IAS but has not made the top 20 with respect to RAS
(i.e. taxable) profits. Indeed, MDM and Alfa ranked fourth and fifth, respectively, among
Russian banks when ranked by IAS profits. Other banks near the top of the list on IAS profits
but posting small RAS profits included Sobinbank, Zenit and MezhInvestBank. The gaps
between IAS and RAS accounts are sometimes enormous. Alfa-banks RAS profits were just
5.4% of its declared IAS profits, while MDMs were only 10.7%. The corresponding figures for
Avangard, Sobinbank and Mezhinvestbank were 19.7%, 25.9% and 33.4%, respectively, and
that for Probiznesbank was 44.3%. Numerous other examples could be cited.73 
Table 2: Largest declared profits of Russian banks for 2000
Bank Declared profit, 2000
(Rb 000)
Own capital, 01.01.01
(Rb 000)
Return on capital,
RAS (%)
Sberbank 17 444 055 47 554 373 36.68
Vneshtorgbank 3 574 690 49 428 553 7.23
Rosbank 3 230 733 9 490 947 34.04
Citibank T/O 2 112 152 2 957 129 71.43
DIB 977 883 3 139 299 31.15
CSFB 919 320 1 647 232 55.81
Deutsche Bank 815 869 2 532 700 32.21
Bashkreditbank 660 700 4 184 484 15.78
IngBank (Evraziya) 631 148 1 580 789 39.93
Menatep SPb 616 013 1 990 904 30.94
KreditUralBank 615 579 655 840 93.86
Gazprombank 580 706 17 250 131 3.37
Mezhprombank 514 420 26 753 429 1.92
Promstroibank SPb 468 592 1 670 744 28.05
Petrokommerts 453 592 1 485 632 30.53
Transkreditbank 411 445 1 430 784 28.76
Evrofinans 379 868 2 057 626 18.46
ABN Amro 369 466 1 267 550 29.15
Mezhmosbank 354 780 2 521 418 14.07
Nizhegorodpromstroibank 342 884 903 774 37.94
Source: IC Rating, Spisok krupneishikh bankov Rossii po sostoyaniyu na 01.01.01, (http://www.rating.ru/rus/
100/01_01_01_100.htm); and A. Skabichevskii, Nedokhodnoe mesto, Kompaniya-banki 4(28) (9 April 2001).
This discrepancy between IAS and RAS profits suggests one possible solution to the problem of
calculating the true tax burden: estimating profit tax bills based on RAS (i.e. 43% of the
reported figure) and comparing these rough estimates of taxes paid with reported IAS profits, on
the assumption that the IAS figures, being unrelated to tax bills, are a better indicator of true
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profitability. Unfortunately, such an assumption is unwarranted. Russian banks have proved
adept at manipulating IAS accounts to present whatever picture they regard as necessary, a task
made easier by the fact that the IAS figures they release are often based on adjustments to RAS
figures rather than on accounts actually kept under IAS rules.74 A comparison of IAS and RAS
accounts for 24 major Russian banks shows exactly half reporting larger profits under RAS -
sometimes much larger. The RAS profits of Surgutneftegazbank and Rosbank, for example,
were 39.1 and 36.5 times as large as their IAS profits, respectively, while the figure for
Promsvyazbank was 30.1 times larger. There are many reasons why banks might report larger
RAS profits: those facing large external debt-service payments need to show an RAS profit and
will in any case be able to avoid a good deal of the tax on the reported profit, while banks
engaged in restructuring talks with foreign creditors will not want to show too large a profit
(both these factors may be at work in the case of Rosbank). State banks tend to report larger
RAS profits because their accounting practices are partly determined by the authorities. The key
point is that IAS profits do not provide a basis on which to make judgements about real
profitability and real tax burdens. Unless managers are under pressure from shareholders to
show profits, there is little to prevent them from continuing to minimise declared profits,
whichever accounting system they use. 
A third reason for thinking the banks may not be so weighed down by heavy taxation is that,
while the power of the oligarchic banks in the Yeltsin era was often grossly exaggerated,75 the
banking lobby as a whole has been very successful in resisting tax innovations that it opposes.
In 1996, for example, the banks thwarted a short-lived move by the State Tax Service to use the
official TsBR exchange rate, rather than the spread between the buy and sell rates, as the basis
for calculating banks profits from dealing in foreign exchange. On current transactions, this
meant nothing in practice except that all transactions were formally executed at the central bank
rate, with any deviation from that rate being expressed in the level of commission charged rather
than in the recorded exchange rate. However, the authorities sought to apply it retrospectively to
1994 and 1995 as well. The proposal for mandatory use of the TsBR rate was revived in late
1997 as pressure on the rouble exchange rate mounted.76 The banks spent most of 1997 and
early 1998 waging an ultimately successful battle against proposals to supplement the profit tax
on banks with a tax on assets. The early drafts of the new Russian Federation Tax Code
proposed calculating banks profit tax according to the usual method as well as calculating a tax
on their assets. They would then be charged the larger of the two sums. For most banks, this
would have been the assets tax, which would in many cases have been 10 or 20 times greater.77
The assets tax would have had particularly perverse consequences under RAS rules, which, for
example, treat losses and a host of other balance sheet items that are not assets in any economic
sense as assets for purposes of accounting.
In 1998, in the wake of the August collapse, the rouble fell four-fold against the dollar. The
rouble value of dollar-denominated assets and liabilities jumped dramatically virtually
overnight. Banks whose dollar liabilities exceeded their dollar assets failed. Those with an
                                                                
74 See Vedomosti, 23 October 2001, and 5 November 2001; and Vremya novostei, 26 October 2001. 
75 See Tompson, Banking after 1998, and Duncan Allan, The Shares for Loans Auctions: the Banks as Lobbyists,
in David Lane (ed.), Russian Banking: Evolution, Problems and Prospects (London: Edward Elgar, forthcoming
2002).
76 See Yurii Katsman, Kak bankam vyrvatsya iz obyatii gosudarstva?, Kommersant 20 (4 June 1996), pp. 502;
and ITAR-TASS, 13 November 1997. It is typical of the handling of tax policy that this innovation was introduced
via a letter of instruction from the GNS (NP-4-05/26n) rather than a decree or legislative act.
77 See Finansovye izvestiya, 10 December 1996, 20 January 1997 and 2 October 1997; Finansovaya Rossiya, 24 April
1997; Delovoi mir, 1 October 1997; Russkii telegraf, 7 October 1997; and Pismo ot 21.01.98 No. A-02/2-48,
Vestnik ARB, 29 January 1998. This was not as exotic a measure as the banks pretended: similar approaches were
employed in some developing countries in response to accounting manipulations by banks.
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excess of dollar assets over liabilities faced a different problem. To the extent that the increase
in the rouble value of assets was not offset by countervailing increases in the rouble value of
dollar-denominated liabilities, the banks had to put the gains through their P&L accounts. Thus,
they faced tax demands for massive but unrealised foreign exchange gains. These gains were
accounting fictions because the loans had not yet been repaid and in many cases never would
be. Unless and until repayment actually took place, there were no real revenues from which the
taxes could be paid. The banks and the MNS agreed an ad hoc solution in early 1999. However,
no permanent resolution has been achieved, as can be seen from the example of the Khrunichev
Machine-Building Plant, which produces the launch vehicles for Russias space programme.
The rockets used for the international space station were financed by a dollar loan and entered
into the balance sheet at the pre-1998 exchange rate. When Khrunichev finally delivered the
rockets, charging the same dollar price as the loan plus interest, it had to record the sale at the
post-crisis exchange rate. This generated a massive rouble profit, which the tax authorities
want to share. In other words, the banks and the MNS struck a bargain over nonsensical rules in
a manner that still remains to be formalised.
More recently, the banks have done very well out of the new Tax Code.78 The code preserves
the exemption of most banking operations from VAT, with the exception of the provision of
services for third parties for a commission. Indeed, the range of banking operations exempted
from VAT is actually broader under chapter 21 of the new code than it was previously. Many
small and medium banks will gain substantial relief from article 145 of chapter 21, which
stipulates that a taxpayer whose tax base for VAT purposes is less than Rb1m over a three-
month period may be freed from VAT liability altogether for the coming year. Arrangements for
calculating and paying VAT have also been made less laborious and hence less costly. The new
ESN is also a welcome change for the banks. Its basic 35.6% rate is 2.9 percentage points below
the cumulative rate of the taxes it replaces, and the banks are well placed to benefit from its
regressive scale, since they tend to pay their employees much higher salaries than are found in
most sectors and will probably be better able than most corporates to deal with the restrictions
on the application of the sliding scale described above. The falling marginal rate of the ESN will
further reduce the incentives to pay those salaries via insurance and other schemes designed to
avoid taxation. The effect of this change will not be dramatic, however, as the decline in the
basic rate is small and the regressive scale begins to take effect only at a salary level of Rb8,333
per month. The lowest rate (5% in 2001 but 2% from 2002) applies only to incomes of
Rb50,000 a month or more.79 The banks will also benefit from the introduction of the new profit
tax, as its single lower rate will now apply to them as well. The most significant change,
however, is the abolition of the federal road tax and the local tax for support of housing and
socio-cultural infrastructure.80 These taxes were levied on banks gross income rather than
profits and were thus particularly unpopular. 
The banks principal remaining grievance with the code is the introduction of accrual rather than
cash accounting when calculating their profit tax bases from 1 January 2002. Like other Russian
corporates, the banks bitterly resent having to pay tax on what they claim to be fictitious income
(i.e. receivables not yet received). The TsBR, fearing that higher tax bills would impede the
banks efforts to build up their capital, supported their calls for delay, as in late 2001 the banks
tried to secure a postponement to 2004, when IAS accounts (which require accrual accounting)
become mandatory.81 The intensity of the banks opposition to the accrual method is difficult to
fathom, since costs as well as revenues can be accrued. It may be born of a fear that the tax
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organs will try to apply the principle asymmetrically - that is, to income but not expenditure. A
more likely explanation is that many banks collude with borrowers and other debtors to use
agreed payment delays in order to shift tax liabilities from one accounting period to another.
Optimisation strategies 
Russian banks have over their short histories perfected a wide range of strategies for optimising
their tax bills. This section provides a brief - and far from comprehensive - survey of the many
ways in which banks work to minimise their obligations under the most important taxes to
which they are subject. 
Despite the fact that their activities are largely exempt from VAT, the banks have devised
numerous schemes for avoiding VAT on those activities not covered by the exemption.
Makarevich, who has both worked in and closely observed Russian banks since the sector was
in its infancy, identifies a host of strategies employed to keep VAT bills down. In the first place,
the banks adopt the broadest possible interpretations of the exemptions that do exist. They do
not, for example, tend to pay VAT on the sale of collateral or the preparation of share
certificates and other securities for themselves and their clients. Both these activities could, with
some generosity of interpretation, be construed as banking operations. However, the MNS
rejects the claim that the preparation of the physical documents involved in a securities issue
constitutes a securities transaction and argues that the sale of collateral is not a banking
operation at all, but is rather realisation of bank property, which is subject to VAT. Broking
operations performed for a commission are often recorded in bank records as operations with
their own funds, thus avoiding VAT on the commission, and banks generally try to pay VAT on
forex operations in roubles rather than hard currency.82
In most respects, the profit tax is the easiest to minimise while remaining more or less within
the law. RAS rules leave considerable scope for presenting a suitably distressing picture to the
taxman and thus minimising taxable profits. The following are just a few of the devices
employed to achieve this end. One of the easiest is to enter into an agreement with another
company (usually one controlled by the bank) to undertake a (fictitious) joint investment
project. The funds in question are then tied up on the balance sheet until the project is
realised.83 Purchases of securities, vekselya and other such instruments are often recorded at
nominal values rather than at the actual purchase prices, and the banks tend to adopt an
extremely expansive interpretation of the tax break applying to capital investment. Many tax
officials take the view that this break does not apply to the banks at all, but the banks use it to
cover such forms of capital investment as the acquisition of automobiles and flats for bank
managers.84 Banking activities are similarly easy to manipulate. Depending on tax rates and
payment dates, bank loans may be front-loaded with commissions and fees or, on the contrary,
VAT-able commissions may be hidden under the guise of interest charges. Moreover, because
penalties paid on loan arrears are not taxable, banks often arrange non-payment with their
borrowers: the banks accept the penalties in lieu of repayment, while using the apparently bad
loan further to reduce tax bills under other headings.85 Officially reported expenditures on
advertising, consultancy and information services are routinely inflated, and the commissions
charged on many financial operations can easily be hidden if the transactions involved are
                                                                
82 Makarevich, Novye aspekty, p. 71; Beletskii, p. 31.
83 Ivanov, Nalogovaya politika, p. 10.
84 Finansovye izvestiya, 13 November 1997; Makarevich, pp. 712.
85 This practice makes it all the more difficult to interpret data on problem assets: the general assumption is that they
have been under-stated, which appears to be the case, but in some cases what are apparently non-performing loans are
in fact being repaid in other ways (thus deserving the classification of non-standard assets).
Taxation of Russian banks 21
sufficiently complex. Expenditure on security is an especially peculiar item. Banks can write off
against tax their expenditure on outside security firms but not spending on the maintenance of
their own security services.86 However, it does not take much creativity in the field of corporate
law for banks to create independent security agencies of their own. When calculating taxable
profits, the banks count as costs many other forms of expenditure that should not be excluded
from the profit tax base.87 In addition, the banks often fail to amortise new fixed assets, treating
the entire purchase price as an up-front cost. When transactions in government securities were
tax exempt, the authorities claimed that the banks were using operations on the government-
paper market to channel income from other sources out of their taxable income. In short,
manipulations with GKOs and OFZs were used as a form of money laundering, not to make
criminal money clean but to make taxable income tax-exempt.88 
In theory, the real constraint on profit-minimisation should be shareholder interests. However, if
banks shareholders are not primarily interested in profitability, then there is little reason for the
banks to show profits in their accounts. As we have seen, many if not most banks are controlled
by shareholders whose primary interest is in using the banks to maintain control over their own
financial flows, to help minimise their tax bills and, in many cases, to evade currency controls.
Like all other employers, the banks devote considerable effort to limiting the employer
contributions made under the ESN, which were previously paid as separate social taxes, as well
as limiting their employees personal income tax liability.89 Payment of a share of employees
income in unrecorded black cash was and remains the simplest and most common method of
avoiding social taxes, as well as the personal income tax, but a range of more complex methods
has also been employed. Until 1997, one of the most widespread non-cash stratagems - and one
the banks were particularly well placed to execute - involved the use of interest-free loans as
substitutes for wage payments. The employer would make a small, interest-free loan to his
employee in lieu of a salary; usually the loan was for a long period, perhaps ten years or more.
The employee would then deposit the loaned funds in a bank savings account on which the bank
paid a very high rate - often 1,000% per annum or more. A non-bank employer would then pay
the bank the rest of the employees salary (which was then paid on to the employee as
interest), as well as a service charge. In the case of a bank, no service charge was needed. The
salary was thus paid as a combination of loan and interest. Until 1997, Russian law taxed
neither the loan nor the interest received by the employee. Once the law changed, the employee
had to include in taxable income the difference between the interest rate of the loan (usually
zero) and two-thirds of the TsBR refinancing rate (assuming the latter was higher) as well as the
difference between the interest on his deposit and the refinancing rate (assuming the latter was
lower).90 In fact, enforcement of the new tax rules was patchy for some time.91 
Other common schemes for avoiding personal income and social taxes involve insurance
policies and shares. Until 1995, life insurance premiums were tax deductible, so many firms,
including many banks, took out short-term policies for their employees at the end of each month
and set these against tax liabilities. Since the policies were very short-term, they would mature
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almost immediately, but the resulting payouts would not be subject to social taxes.92 Simpler
still are stock-for-salary schemes, under which the employee receives a stock option in lieu of
salary, allowing him to purchase stock in the company at a nominal price within a specified time
period. The employee exercises the option and the employer immediately buys back the stock at
an inflated price, with the difference representing a salary substitute.93 More generally,
employers can avoid social taxes by simply reducing salaries and wages, while increasing the
share of employee income that is comprised of payouts from net profits, whether these be
dividends (which requires making employees into stockholders with sufficiently large stakes to
secure substantial dividends) or simply bonuses. From 1 January 2002, dividends will be taxed
at a 6% rate and bonuses at the standard 13% rate of income tax.94 The new, lower income-tax
rate has made it far more important to avoid the 35.6% ESN than to avoid income tax and has
thus made it easier to construct alternative remuneration schemes. 
The banks quickly discovered a simple if laborious way around the tax on sales of foreign
currency. The tax applies only to cash purchases by individuals, not to withdrawals of foreign
cash from foreign currency accounts or to roubleforex conversions involving only bank money
(i.e. non-cash). The banks thus adopted the practice of recording each transaction as the latter.
Instant rouble and forex deposit accounts were opened. Clients roubles were then deposited in
the rouble accounts, converted into hard currency and transferred to the forex accounts before
being withdrawn as foreign currency. The result was that the law triggered a significant drop in
cash dollar purchases and a matching rise in withdrawals from foreign currency deposits in
Russian banks. There was little or no real effect on the total turnover on the foreign exchange
cash market. From the beginning, therefore, the tax netted the government around 20% of the
revenues it had been expected to generate, although it did impose additional costs on the
banks.95
Formal and informal responses: the tax organs strategies 
As we have argued above, the tax organs responses to the banks activities (and to those of
other taxpayers) involve a variety of informal - and, indeed, often illegal - behaviours. In many
ways, these behaviours exhibit a high degree of continuity with the Soviet period and reflect the
extent to which officials have responded to post-Soviet challenges by reaching for familiar
templates when devising solutions. During the Brezhnev era, T. H. Rigby drew attention to the
fact that Soviet administrative bureaucracies were far more concerned than their western
counterparts with directing economic and social activities rather than regulating them. Most
economic bureaucracies, of course, do both, but one or the other normally predominates.
Largely as a result of constant pressure to meet plan targets, task fulfilment virtually always
took precedence over rule application. Indeed, rule violations were often tacitly condoned in
the interests of task-fulfilment.96 
Such was the nature of the command economy. The role of the state in a market economy, by
contrast, is overwhelmingly regulatory: what the market most requires of the state is consistent
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and impartial rule adjudication and enforcement.97 However, Russian officials have approached
many of the challenges of marketisation in a task-fulfilling frame of mind - with revenue
collection as the most urgent task for most of the 1990s. Faced with a choice between observing
formal rules and meeting revenue targets, tax inspectors consistently opt for the latter. Any
qualms they may have about the dubious legality of some of their actions are likely to be
assuaged by an awareness of the pervasiveness of tax avoidance.98 At the same time, the use of
both revenue targets and, in many cases, the sort of material incentives mentioned above leaves
officials in no doubt about what their political masters require of them.
The weakness of the tax organs is a further factor contributing to their reliance on informal
methods. This weakness is both institutional and political. The institutional weakness can be
seen as a legacy of Soviet state-building strategies. Early Soviet leaders relied heavily on an
informal structure of personal networks to enhance the new regimes administrative capacities
as rapidly as possible. The resulting patrimonial system of administration relied more on
patron-client ties and the distribution of rewards than on the application and enforcement of
rules and formalised codes of behaviour.99 Such personalistic administrative structures tend to
encourage rent-seeking and corruption and to raise monitoring and enforcement costs. The post-
Soviet reformers sought in the first instance to direct the patrimonial structure they had inherited
to their own ends rather than to transform it. Easter sees this structure as a major impediment to
effective revenue collection and notes that there was no serious attempt to reform tax
administration until 1998.100 The states heavy reliance on the banking system for tax collection
was in no small measure a reflection of the tax organs own administrative weakness.101 This
institutional weakness was long compounded by political weakness: for most of the 1990s,
Russias tax chiefs - initially the head of the State Tax Service (GNS) and latterly the Minister
for Taxes and Duties (MNS) - were second-rank political figures who tended to lose their jobs
relatively quickly if they were too aggressive in pursuit of delinquent non-payers.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that senior MNS officials acknowledge the need for a certain
creativity (tvorchestvo) in tax administration, not least vis-à-vis the banks.102 Examples of
such creativity abound, with respect to both the banks own tax liabilities and their role in
monitoring and processing the tax payments of their clients. In the mid-1990s, for example, the
fiscal organs adopted a remarkably expansive interpretation of the requirement that a corporate
entity wishing to open a bank account must first inform its tax inspectorate of the type of
account it wished to open and the chosen bank.103 The bank could not perform any operations on
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the account without a certificate (spravka) from the tax organs confirming that they had been
notified. Although the regulations made it quite clear that companies need only inform the tax
organs of what they were doing, tax officials acted as though they had considerable discretion to
decide whether or not to allow the enterprise to open a new account, often refusing to issue the
required spravka. Usually, they were motivated by a desire to prevent companies from using
banks seen as unreliable when it came to transferring clients tax payments or to prevent
enterprises from opening accounts in other jurisdictions - something many companies had good
reason to do, given the state of the payments system.104 Similar creativity was and is applied in
respect to the banks own tax bills. Tax inspectors have been known to treat the sales prices of
securities as the actual profit earned in cases where banks engaged in securities transactions
could not provide documentary proof of both buying and selling prices. 
Though often of dubious legality, the  fiscal organs creativity is not always wholly informal.
Often it takes the form of written MNS instructions and rulings that contradict - or at least
subvert - primary legislation.105 Thus, when the government and the central bank agreed that
banks would be allowed to use profits generated in 2000 to cover losses from the crisis years
1998 and 1999, the MNS issued an instruction stipulating that profits must be used to cover
previous years losses in equal portions over five years.106 As noted above, the attempt to
redefine the tax base for foreign exchange transactions in 1996 was a GNS initiative. Tax
officials treatment of asset sales and other transfers has also relied on instructions and
regulations that appeared sharply at odds with primary legislation. The tax inspectorate in Orel
Oblast at one point insisted that an SBS-Agro branchs taxable profit from the transfer of real
property to its parent bank was the full value of the asset transferred rather than deducting from
the price the remaining (i.e. unamortised) value of the asset, subject to revaluation if necessary.
The tax inspectorate was trying to counter what it believed was the banks use of transfer
pricing to avoid tax on the transaction. Its action was thus a rational, if informal, response to an
informal practice widely employed by banks and other corporates. It was also clearly illegal, as
it involved stretching the application of an MNS normative act to cover circumstances falling
under article 8.1 of the 1991 law on the profit tax.107
The crude reality, according to many bankers - and, off the record, at least, some tax officials -
is even worse. Tax inspectors, working to their assigned plans, pretty well know how much they
have to gather from the major corporates they handle. This sum is often the subject of
negotiation between the taxpayer and the official, and it is generally best for the taxpayer to
reach agreement and pay up. Of course, the terms of the negotiation depend not only on the
letter of the law and the financial position of the taxpayer: the political connections and social
significance of the enterprise are often important as well, which is why large industrial firms
have been able to run up such large arrears with relative impunity. If a taxpaying enterprise that
lacks this kind of political support regards the demands as so excessive that they must be
resisted, it may do so in court, but it runs the risk of attracting a full-scale audit by the tax
organs, which will almost certainly turn up so many technical violations that the resulting bill
will be larger than the original demand. The complexity and lack of internal consistency of tax
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legislation virtually guarantee such an outcome. According to Tosunyan, such thoroughgoing
tax investigations are often performed to order, with political opponents or commercial rivals
using the tax organs to settle private scores.108 
While relying heavily on informal and/or illegal practices,109 the GNS/MNS has sought to
extend its formal control over the banking system. Long before the financial collapse of 1998,
the tax authorities, citing the results of their investigations into the banks tax payment records
and their handling of clients tax payments, were lobbying hard for the adoption of a range of
measures that would give them greater legal authority over the sector, including proposals to
install tax officials inside individual banks on a permanent basis110 and to empower the GNS to
assign major corporate taxpayers to particular banks for purposes of handling tax payments.111
This latter proposal, which directly contradicted the law on banks and banking, was aimed at
separating major corporates from banks that they themselves controlled and operated in order to
facilitate tax avoidance. If adopted, it would have struck at the very raison dêtre of many
banks, which exist chiefly in order to give their owners maximum control over their own
financial flows. The most extreme forms of the proposals suggested that the largest taxpayers
would be assigned directly to the central bank. The GNS also prepared its own ratings of
Russian banks, based on their handling of tax payments.112 
The tax ministry was even more aggressive in the wake of the August crisis. Determined to
extract tax revenues trapped in the frozen accounts of failed banks, the ministry was in the
forefront of calls for more bankruptcies, a position that brought it into direct conflict with the
TsBR.113 MNS officials even went so far as to suggest that the TsBR was colluding with
commercial banks to protect the latter from the fisc.114 During his brief stint as Minister of Taxes
and Duties, the ambitious Georgii Boos demanded the right to disqualify delinquent banks from
handling any state funds. Boos also demanded the right to compel taxpayers to shift their
accounts to banks designated by the MNS and the right to ask that the TsBR remove a banks
licence on account of tax arrears. If the TsBR had refused such a request, Boos wanted the
central bank itself to present the MNS with a plan for restructuring the delinquent banks tax
debts.115 
Boos also demanded the lifting of over 50 banks licences and ordered tax inspectors to refuse
to register accounts opened in banks responsible for delayed tax payments.116 His successor,
Aleksandr Pochinok, sought to take further the MNSs encroachment on the TsBRs regulatory
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powers, including a government order preventing the Agency for Restructuring Credit
Organisations (ARKO), supervised by the TsBR, from issuing stabilisation credits without MNS
approval.117 In the end, little came of any of these proposals, before or after the crisis. The
commercial banks, backed by the TsBR, which jealously defended its position as the sectors
regulator, successfully thwarted both Boos and Pochinok, neither of whom was a political figure
of equal standing to central bank chief Viktor Gerashchenko.
One recent innovation that may have important implications for the future is the shift towards
sectoral specialisation on the part of tax inspectorates. This process is in its infancy and may
never unfold across the whole country, but recent measures taken in Moscow highlight the
authorities interest in the potential to improve tax administration by allowing local tax
inspectorates to specialise. Thus, the tax affairs of all commercial banks in the city of Moscow
have been transferred to the citys specially established 42nd inspectorate. Only those banks
where litigation issues remain have not yet been transferred.118 The logic is obvious: tax officials
with greater expertise in a particular field of economic activity are likely to be better at
identifying and thwarting the tax optimisation strategies most commonly employed in that
sector. If widely adopted, this could have a major impact on many sectors, but its implications
for the banks are particularly significant because of the dual nature of their relationship with the
fisc. Banks are, as noted above, both taxpayers themselves and important agents of the state in
the field of tax administration. Hitherto, a given bank has generally been handled by the same
tax inspectorate that was looking after the banks clients. The need to secure a banks
cooperation in dealing with the latter might well temper its tax inspectors treatment of the bank
itself. In future, however, it is much more likely that the bank could find itself being handled by
an inspector who is a specialist in the taxation of banks, while it deals with other tax inspectors
in connection with its clients activities. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing points to several conclusions. First, legislative change, crucial though it is, does
not represent the greatest challenge facing Russias tax reformers. No less important, if tax
reform is to succeed, will be formalising the fiscal system, closing the gap that now exists
between the formal and informal rules of the fiscal game. Citibank T/O chief Alan Hirsts claim
that what we really want is for the authorities to implement the rules that they already have
reflects a widely shared sentiment. Predictability and transparency are both highly desirable,
from the point of view of both private agents and, ultimately, the state. Tax reform will not have
succeeded until taxpayers know that their tax bills will be determined on the basis of clear,
stable rules consistently applied, rather than on negotiating skill and relations with officials. 
Secondly, the approach to tax reform taken by the present government is broadly correct.
Simplifying the system and lowering rates should make it easier to bring actual practice into line
with formal rules. The success of the new 13% income tax is instructive here. Sceptics argued
that taxpayers who had avoided paying at the old 30% rate would just as happily avoid payment
at the new lower one. However, this overlooked two key points, which should be borne in mind
when evaluating other tax changes. First, a simpler tax will tend to close off many legal options
for tax avoidance. It should also reduce opportunities for corruption and arbitrary official
behaviour, since the complexity of the tax system is one of the greatest weapons in the hands of
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revenue-hungry tax inspectors looking for creative ways to meet revenue targets. Secondly, as
noted above, there is usually a non-zero cost to not paying tax. Lowering rates thus changes the
calculations taxpayers make about whether or not to pay: these hinge on the difference between
the costs of compliance and the cost of avoidance, subject to the risk of detection (raising this
risk is also a priority, as at present it is very low). A lower rate will not lead to full compliance
but it should increase compliance at the margin. Thus, a simpler tax regime relying on low,
stable rates and free of the numerous exemptions and concessions that still exist today, may well
increase tax yields while reducing the overall burden of taxation.
